/.'  ^  <'   f    0 


CONFIDENTIAL  I 

FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 


INFANTRY 

IN  THE  DEFENSE 


Translated  at  the  Army  War  College 
From  a  French  Document 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1917 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

Document  No.  642. 
Office  of  The  Adjutant  General, 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  Any  list  1,  /.'>/?. 

The  following  pamphlet  on  Infantry  in  the  Defense  is  pub- 
lished for  the  infornmtion  of  all  concerned. 
[062.1,^0.0.] 

BY  Q1U)KK  OF  THE   SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

TASKER  H.  BLISS, 

Major  General,  Acting  Chief  of  titaff. 
OFFICIAL  : 

H.  P.  MCCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 

AVAR  DEPARTMENT, 

THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  June  19,  .1911. 
To  all  Officers  of  the  Army: 

You  are  advised  that  this  and  all  subsequent  documents  of  a 
similar  character  which  may  be  furnished  to  you  from  this 
office  are  to  be  regarded  as  strictly  confidential.  They  are  to 
be  kept  at  all  times  in  your  personal  possession,  and  are  not  to 
be  copied,  nor  are  any  parts  of  their  contents  to  be  communicated 
either  directly  or  indirectly  to  the  press  nor  to  any  persons  not 
in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United  States.  In  Europe 
these  documents  are  not  to  be  carried  into  the  front-line 
trenches  nor  farther  to  the  front  than  the  usual  post  of  the 
officers  to  whom  issued. 

Strict  compliance  with  this  injunction  is  enjoined  upon  every 
officer  into  whose  hands  any  of  these  confidential  documents 
may  come. 

BY  ORDEK  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

H.  P.  MCCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 
(3) 


INFANTRY  IN  THE  DEFENSE. 


As  \vo  said  in  ti)«'  lasi  locuire.  the  principal  duty  of  tlie  in- 
fantry of  a  sector  is  to  defend  that  part  of  the  front  which 
lias  been  assigned  In  it. 

In  much  the  same  way,  in  open  warfare,  we  must  stand  ready 
lo  defend  ourselves  as  soon  as  our  advance  ceases,  whether  it  be 
voluntarily  or  at  the  instance  of  the  enemy. 

We  shall  study  today,  therefore,  the  conditions  under  which 
the  infantry  can  and  should  defend  itself. 

Onli/  (in  firlire  defen-xc  brings  results.  We  have  already 
shown,  in  speaking  of  the  method  of  action  employed  by  the 
infantry,  that  Hie  defense  muxt  he  actirc,  must  be  based  not 
only  upon  the  employment  of  fire  but  also  upon  the  employ- 
ment of  action.  This  is  the  fundamental  principle  which  domi- 
nates the  whole  question,  and  with  which  the  infantry  must 
be  imbued. 

Our  former  regulations  are  therefore  to  be  modified  so  as  to 
read  : 

"  The  infantry  placed  on  the  defensive  will  not  make  untimely 
or  unjustifiable  attacks  which  would  run  the  risk  of  lessening 
its  capacity  for  resistance  and  expose  it  to  a  check  whose  conse- 
quences might  be  serious."  (Art.  112  of  the  Field  Service.) 

Or  again : 

"  Fire  is  the  only  means  of  strife  fot-  the  units  whose  mission 
holds  them  momentarily  at  a  given  point."  (Art.  337,  Maneu- 
ver Regulations.) 

The  experience  of  war  has  clearly  shown,  as  the  note  from 
Oneral  Headquarters  December  f>,  1915,  stated,  that  "the  only 
definite  methods  of  procedure  really  practical  are:  Fire  and 
counter  offensive;  passive  defense  having  lost  all  its  value." 

Before  studying  the  defense  in  position  warfare  it  is  not  with- 
out interest  to  examine  what  it  might  mean  in  open  warfare. 

(5) 


I.  THE  DEFENSE  IX  OPEN  WARFARE. 

Our  former  regulations  did  not  anticipate  the  form  that  war 
has  taken  since  the  immobilization  of  the  fronts,  but  they  con- 
templated certain  units  of  the  battle  front  being  force*!  to  as- 
sume, momentarily,  a  defensive  attitude.  We  therefore  tint!  in 
them  a  certain  number  of  principles  that  always  hold  and  that 
are  applicable  to  position  warfare  as  well  as  to  open  warfare. 

First.  "A  unit  of  infantry."  says  the  Maneuver  Regulations, 
whose  mission  is  to  hold  a  certain  point  must  never  abandon  it 
without  an  order.  It  must  resist  to  the  very  last:  each  man 
should  be  killed  at  his  post  rather  than  yield  ground.  If  the 
enemy  succeeds  in  driving  the  unit  back,  the  atter  must  use 
every  available  resource  to  regain  the  ground  lost." 

Second.  "  The  unit  receives  an  order  of  defense,  defining  the 
task  to  be  performed,  the  part  of  the  terrain  upon  which  the 
resistance  is  to  be  organized,  the  conditions  of  this  organization. 
the  probable  time  available,  the  material  means  put  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  unit,  the  location  of  the  command  post  of  the  supe- 
rior, and  the  communications  to  be  established,  whether  with 
this  post  or  with  the  neighboring  units  and  the  artillery." 

Third.  Preparation  for  the  defensive.    It  consists  of — 

(a)  The  reconnaissances  of  positions. 

(6)   The  defensive  organization  of  these  positions. 

(c)  The  distribution  of  troops. 

(d)  The  measures  of  security  to  be  taken. 

These  are,  in  fact,  the  same  operations  as  those  of  which  we 
spoke  with  regard  to  the  outposts,  but  more  developed,  because 
there  is  generally  more  time. 

(a)  The  reconnaissance*  have  a  bearing,  not  only  upon  the  ter- 
rain which  the  infantry  is  to  occupy,  but  also  upon  that  which 
the  adversary  is  obliged  to  pass  through  in  order  to  attack  the 
position  to  be  occupied. 

The  defensive  position  is  chosen  in  such  a  way  that  the  artil- 
lery can  support  its  infantry  efficiently,  and  that  the  numbers 
necessary  to  occupy  it  may  be  as  low  as  possible. 

The  reconnaissance  of  a  position  is  made  to  determine  the 
accidents  of  the  ground  to  be  occupied  and  the  measures  to  be 
taken  tp  flank  the  intervals,  to  investigate  the  approaches  which 
might  cover  the  enemy's  advance  and  the  necessary  passages, 
to  determine  what  part  of  the  terrain  must  be  occupied  to  check 
the  attack  effectively  by  fire,  and  finally,  to  prepare  the  counter 


sittacks  and  even  the  resumption  of  the  offensive  in  accordance 
with  the  facilities  which  the  terrain  offers. 

Reconnaissance  thus  permits  the  coordination  of  preparations 
for  defense  of  the  front  by  the  creation  or  improvement  of  the 
strong  points  chosen  judiciously  and  grouped  as  centers  of  re- 
sixhuice.  The  trace  of  these  elements  ought  to  permit  them 
to  flank  each  other,  to  escape  the  notice  of  the  enemy's  artillery, 
to  furnish  powerful  lire  up  to  800  and  1,000  meters,  "  a  distance 
which  corresponds  to  the  actually  effective  range  of  the  rifle." 
If  the  field  of  fire  is  more  restricted,  it  is  necessary  to  multiply 
the  obstacles,  the  auxiliary  defenses,  the  flanking  defenses.  The 
infantry  must,  by  its  fire,  force  the  enemy  to  remain  as  long 
as  possible  upon  those  parts  of  the  terrain  which  the  artillery 
can  most  effectively  sweep. 

"The  lines  occupied  in  front  of  I"' 3  main  position  and  the 
advanced  positions  are,  on  general  principles,  to  be  avoided. 
They  lead  to  the  scattering  of  the  forces  and  to  partial  repulses 
of  such  a  nature  as  to  weaken  the  morale  of  the  troops  main- 
tained upon  the  line  of  resistance. 

(&)  "  The  defensive  organization  (the  preparation  for  the  de- 
fense) of  the  positions  chosen  is  confided  to  the  infantry  whose 
duty  it  is  to  occupy  them,  reinforced  in  case  of  necessity  by  de- 
tachments of  the  engineers. 

"  This  preparation  for  the  defense  ought  to  be  pursued  in 
accordance  with  a  general  plan,  carried  out  progressively  and 
advanced  as  far  as  the  time  and  means  at  their  disposal  will 
permit. 

"A  methodical  putting  into  a  state  of  defense  includes  the 
organization  of  the  trenches  where  the  troops  will  be  place*!,  of 
the  protected  lines  of  communications,  of  the  telephonic  com- 
munications, and,  in  case  of  necessity,  of  the  successive  lines 
which  permit  the  arresting  of  a  first  success  and  the  preparation 
of  the  counter  attacks.  *  *  *  The  best  works  are  the  most 
simple,  those  which  make  use  of  the  accidents  of  the  terrain, 
which  escape  the  view  of  the  enemy  or  are  difficult  to  locate. 
They  should  permit  the  occupants  to  have  extended  view,  shelter 
them  from  fire  and  afford  them  means  of  taking  positions  suited 
to  the  execution  of  fire.  The  trenches  ought  to  be  deep  and 
narrow,  the  excavated  earth  being  hidden  from  sight.  Trenches 
can  be  simulated  to  attract  the  enemy's  fire  upon  the  terrain 
not  occupied  by  the  troops  of  the  defense."  (Arts.  343  and  344 
of  the  Maneuver  Regulations.) 


The  infantry  ought,  therefore,  to  clear  the  field  of  fire  and  nuirk 
the  ranges  carefully. 

The  machine  guns  are  placed  in  such  a  way  as  to  sweep  the 
parts  of  the  terrain  which  the  enemy  is  forced  to  pass.  They  are 
likewise  used  to  flank  the  important  parts  of  the  front. 

Finally,  searchlights  are  established  for  the  night. 

(c)  The  (lixtrihittion  of  tlic  troops  follows  from  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  terrain.    "A  solid  and  judicious  organization  nermits 
the  reduction  of  the  numbers  necessary  to  be  employed  upon  the 
front  and  the  maintenance  of  more  men  in   the  real    for   the 
counter  attacks." 

The  troops  held  in  the  rear  constitute  the  reinforcements 
(platoons,  company)  and  the  troops  arniJalilc  for  wrricc  (bat- 
talion and  superior  units).  Only  the  battalions  and  stronger 
units  are  able  to  combine  the  defense  and  the  counter  attack. 
The  r61e  assigned  to  the  company  remains  simply  defensive  or 
ii  (Tensive. 

(d)  The  weafiitres  of  security  to  be  taken  consist  of  sending 
forward  (in  advance  of  the  position)  either  obxcrriin/  clan  en  IN 
to  give  warning  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  or  security  detach- 
ments of  all  arms,  whose  duty  it  is  to  become  informed  con- 
cerning the  direction  of  the  enemy's  march  and  to  delay  him 
by  a  first  resistance. 

Fourth.  Method  of  carrying  out  the  defense. — When  the  at- 
tack is  planned  the  units  whose  duty  it  is  to  defend  the  front 
occupy  their  combat  or  firing  positions  in  order  to  be  ready  to 
open  fire. 

Fire  is  opened  at  the  captain's  command  and  is  directed  by 
the  platoon  leaders.  It  is  opened  as  soon  as  it  can  be  effective, 
and  from  the  very  beginning  must  be  violent  enough  to  force 
the  enemy  to  halt,  or  at  least  to  advance  only  very  slowly. 

'•  Sheltered  from  tire,  hidden  from  view,  and  thoroughly  famil- 
iar with  the  range,  the  defensive  troops,  even  when  stationed  a 
great  distance  away,  can  inflict  serious  losses  upon  the  enemy. 

'•  Under  certain  circumstances  it  may  be  to  their  interest  to 
open  sudden  lire  at  such  a  distance  as  to  produce  the  maximum 
effect. 

"  It  is  generally  suspended  while  the  enemy's  infantry  is 
halted  and  sheltered  ;  it  is  resumed  as  soon  as  they  advance 
again." 

The  artillery  may  intervene  by  long-range  fire,  but  it  should 
first  and  foremost  reserve  for  itself  the  possibility  of  firing  upon 


tlic  attacking  infantry  when  the  latter  offers  vulnerable  objec- 
tives. "In  case  of  necessity  batteries  or  portions  of  batteries 
are  hidden  until  the  last  moment  to  surprise  the  assaulting  col- 
umns by  Hanking  lire."  (Art.  114  of  the  Field  Service.) 

As  to  the  reinforcement*  and  troop*  arfiitnhle,  their  duty  is 
either  to  support  the  elements  engaged  at  the  front  or  to  make 
the  counter  attack. 

In  the  first  case,  they  mingle  with  these  elements  or  estab- 
lish themselves  in  their  intervals  to  increase  the  intensity  of 
the  tire. 

In  the  second  case,  they  furnish  counter  attacks,  usually  con- 
forming to  a  preconceived  plan,  independent  of  the  incidents 
of  the  fight,  and  resulting  from  the  necessity  of  the  utilization  of 
the  terrain  which  lends  itself  best  to  their  action.  The  order 
for  the  counter  attack  should  fix  the  line  to  be  attained  and 
not  to  be  exceeded.  The  most  favorable  moment  is  that  one 
in  which  the  enemy,  having  come  to  within  a  short  distance,  is 
obliged  to  discontinue  his  artillery  fire  or  to  increase  its  range. 

"Held  ready  under  cover,  usually  behind  the  intervals  of  the 
line  of  resistance,  the  counter  attack  attempts  to  debouch  sud- 
deiili/  and  to  advance  resoHitely,  combining  fire  and  movement 
under  the  conditions  prearranged  for  the  attack." 

The  counter  attacks  are  the  work  of  the  local  commanding 
officer  or  of  the  superior  officer ;  they  are  organized  with  a  view 
to  assuring  the  infantry  that  executes  them  of  the  cooperation 
of  the  other  arms. 

If  the  enemy  succeeds  in  taking  possession  of  a  part  of  the 
line,  the  mission  of  all  should  be  to  prepare  a  strong  counter- 
offensive  to  drive  them  from  the  territory  already  conquered. 
This  is  executed  as  soon  as  the  units  have  been  reorganized 
and  strengthened  by  the  available  troops  that  are  in  the 
vicinity. 

The  greater  part  of  the  principles  incorporated  in  the  Field 
Service  and  the  Maneuver  Regulations  are,  evidently,  perfectly 
applicable  to  the  present  time.  They  have  been  verified  by 
the  experience  of  this  war,  and  bear  in  embryo  the  majority  of 
the  modern  ideas.  If  the  infantry  had  known,  them  well  and  ap- 
plied them  well  from  the  beginning,  it  would  have  adapted  itself 
very  easily  to  trench  warfare ;  but  it  must  be,  confessed  that  it 
had  scarcely  found  its  bearings  in  this  respect. 

To  bring  these  regulations  absolutely  up  to  date,  insistence 
upon  two  points  would  suffice: 

5844"— 17 2 


10 

The  necessity  for  the  cooperation  of  artillery  with  infantry 
and  the  means  of  accomplishing  this. 

The  previous  preparation  for  counter  attacks,  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  they  may  be  as  immediate  as  possihle. 

II.  DEFENSE  IX  TRENCH  WAKFAKK. 

The  main  differences,  for  troops  on  the  defensive,  between 
open  warfare  and  trench  warfare  are  that  in  the  latter — 

(a)  The  assailant  is  at  hand;  he  can  attack  from  near  by, 
a  feature  which  does  away  with  the  difficulties  of  the  approach 
march  and  facilitates  a  sudden  attack. 

(&)  The  two  adversaries  are  provided  with  much  more  power- 
ful means;  offensive  means,  characterized  by  an  artillery  of 
large  caliber,  which  could  not  intervene  in  open  warfare;  defen- 
sive means  created  by  the  semipermanent  fortification. 

Under  these  conditions,  the  problem  that  is  offered  for  tin- 
defense  is  much  more  delicate  than  that  offered  in  open  warfare. 
To  consider  it  more  closely,  we  must  first  of  all  analyze  the  pen- 
era!  methods  employed  by  the  attack. 

(A)    Ifctltvtlx  ciiijtloiit'il   hi/   tin'  attack. — Experience  acquired 
up  to  the  present  time  enables  us  to  distinguish  two  entirely 
different  methods  of  attack  : 
Surprise  attack ; 

Attack  preceded  by  a  longer  or  shorter  artillery  prepara- 
tion. 

The  sudden  or  surprise  attack  is  generally  possible  only  upon 
a  limited  front,  and  with  relatively  weak  numbers.  It  presup- 
poses that  the  auxiliary  defenses  are  destroyed,  which  is  the 
exceptional  case. 

As  to  the  methodical  attack,  preceded  by  abundant  preparations 
on  the  part  of  the  artillery  and  sometimes  accompanied  by  ex- 
plosions of  mines,  by  jets  of  burning  liquids,  or  by  hurling  of 
asphyxiating  gas,  it  can  not  escape  the  vigilance  of  the  defense. 
This  is  the  method  that  has  hitherto  been  employed  for  the  im- 
portant attacks,  on  the  part  of  both  the  Germans  and  the  French. 

Xow,  what  takes  place  during  this  preparation  for  the  attack? 
The  bombardment,  executed  by  considerable  artillery,  often  ex- 
tends to  a  depth  of  several  kilometers.  Its  purpose  is  to  tear  up 
all  the  terrain  on  which  the  projectiles  actually  fall,  to  destroy 
the  auxiliary  defenses  and  everything  else  not  in  bomb-proofs. 
The  material  defenses  of  the  terrain  are  thus  more  or  less 
destroyed. 


11 

As  to  the  personnel  which  is  able  to  escape  destruction,  they 
become  the  object  of  attacks  by  clouds  of  gas  or  by  special  shells. 

The  defensive  artillery  is  likewise  the  target  for  destructive 
lire,  which  is  sometimes  very  effective. 

Cantonments,  bivouacs,  camps,  and  roads  are  rendered  un- 
tenable or  impracticable,  by  night  as  well  as  by  day. 

Finally,  the  telephone  lines,  both  those  in  the  air  and  those 
insufficiently  protected  by  earth,  are  invariably  broken. 

Although  the  probable,  zone  of  attack  chosen  by  the  enemy 
can  be  anticipated,  one  does  not  usually  succeed  in  opposing 
him  with  artillery  in  like  quantity. 

Hence,  it  results  that  the  attack  of  the  infantry,  if  it  has 
been  well  prepared,  finds  at  the  moment  of  attack  only  a  ter- 
rain demolished  and  almost  emptied  of  the  enemy;  it  succeeds 
almost  always  in  taking  possession  of  the  first  lines.  It  is  a 
matter  of  course. 

The  defensive  infantry  situated  in  the  first  lines  is  then  in  a 
very  critical  situation  if  it  has  not  previously  made  prepara- 
tions with  a  view  to  resisting  this  bombardment  and  the  follow- 
ing assault. 

(I?)  Principles  of  the  defense. — The  attack,  as  we  have  said, 
has  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  unite  means  superior  to 
those  of  the  defense,  and.  as  we  shall  see  immediately,  to  pro- 
duce a  certain  effect  of  surprise. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  defense  has  the  advantage  over  the 
attack  of  being  perfectly  familiar  with  the  terrain  over  which 
the  assailant  intends  to  rush,  and  of  being  able  to  organize  at 
leisure  and  employ  strategem  at  will.  It  has,  therefore,  trump 
cards  in  its  play,  too;  it  is  only  a  question  of  knowing  how  to 
employ  them. 

These  trump  cards  are,  as  in  open  warfare: 
Fortification ; 
Fire  effect ; 
Movement ; 

which  must  be  exploited  in  a  more  complete  fashion  and  to  a  de- 
gree still  more  intense. 

The  problem  for  the  defense  is  the  following:  To  succeed, 
after  a  bombardment  which  has  destroyed  the  superficial  ar- 
rangements, in  opposing  the  enemy  with  a  serious  resistance  at 
the  very  moment  when  he  is  making  his  attacks. 

The  fortification. — What  remains  of  the  defensive  arrange- 
ments after  they  have  been  subjected  to  a  powerful  preparation 


12 

by  artillery?  The  shelters,  when  they  are  buried  sufficiently 
deep ;  the  wire  entanglements,  at  least  in  part,  when  the  wire 
is  thick  enough;  some  tlankin.tr  defenses,  when  they  arc  sulli- 
ciently  powerful  or  hidden  ;  some  telephone  linos,  when  they  are 
hurled  deep  enough.  All  the  rest  is  almost  leveled,  and  no  longer 
presents  anything  but  a  series  of  shell  craters,  with  here  and 
there  some  ends  of  trenches. 

One  can  imagine,  then,  that  the  garrison  that  is  well  protected 
•  •an  support  the  bombardment  without  too  much  damage  and  be 
prepared,  at  the  moment  of  assault,  to  man  the  shell  craters  or 
what  remains  of  the  trenches  and  to  drive  back  the  enemy  by  tire. 

One  condition  is,  however,  still  indispensable  to  make  this 
result  certain ;  that  is,  that  the  garrison  in  its  dugouts  can  be 
warned  in  time  of  the  moment  of  the  assault.  Without  this 
warning  it  is  surprised,  destroyed,  or  made  prisoner. 

It  is  an  actual  fact  that  the  attack  neglects  nothing  to  obtain 
a  surprise.  The  artillery  preparation  for  the  infantry  attack 
is  to  a  large  extent  included  therein.  After  executing  several 
false  attacks  in  succession,  the  artillery,  at  the  moment  of  the 
attack,  extends  its  fire  only  at  the  last  minute,  in  such  a  way  as 
to  permit  the  infantry  to  reach  the  enemy's  position  without  being 
seen  and  to  arrive  at  the  dugout  before  the  arrangements  for  the 
light  have  been  made  by  the  enemy. 

From  this  arises  the  necessity  of  the  lookouts  to  anticipate, 
the  launching  of  the  attack,  or  an  emission  of  gas  not  only  in 
the  trench  or  its  vicinity  but  also  at  the  dugout  itself,  playing  for 
the  garrison  the  same  role  that  a  patrolman  does  for  the  police. 

Under  these  conditions  the  semipermanent  fortification  must, 
have  the  means  of  foiling  the  artillery  preparations — that  is 
t«  say,  the  vital  parts  of  the  defense,  of  which  I  spoke  to  you 
apropos  of  the  plan  of  the  trench  works,  must  be  capable  of 
resisting  the  bombardment.  These  means  are : 

First.  Good  shelters,  sufficiently  deep  to  be  really  bombproof, 
and  provided  with  two  and  even  three  outlets. 

Second.  Wire  entanglements,  as  wide  as  possible,  especially 
in  the  rear  of  the  first  trench,  and  made  up  of  rows  of  from 
8  to  10  meters  wide,  separated  by  passages  of  equal  width. 

Third.  Armored  shelters  for  lookouts,  permitting  watch  of 
the  enemy's  infantry  and  warning  of  the  garrison  in  the  dug- 
outs at  any  time  desired. 

Fourth.  Flanking  defenses,  first  of  all  perfectly  hidden,  and, 
secondly,  as  powerful  as  possible. 


13 

Fifth.  Finally,  telephonic  communications,  buried  2  meters 
deep. 

If  one  succeeds  in  endowing  the  defense  with  this  essential 
organisation,  it  will  happen,  if  all  works  as  is.  desired,  that 
the  attack,  a  little  after  it  is  launched,  will  he  received  by  the 
lire  uf  the  Hanking  defenses  and  by  that  of  the  garrisons  that 
have  emerged  from  their  dugouts;  perhaps  they  will  even  throw 
themselves  on  certain  points  of  the  auxiliary  defenses  that  have 
not  been  destroyed;  finally,  the  commander  will  be  warned  and 
informed  in  time. 

There  will  be  found  in  the  note  from  General  Headquarters, 
under  date  of  August  26,  1916,  some  excellent  indications  on 
the  subject  of  improvements  to  be  made  in  our  defensive  or- 
ganizations. 

I-' ire  effect. — The  defense,  having  succeeded  in  preserving  at 
least  a  part  of  its  forces  from  destruction,  tries  at  once  to 
check  the  attack  by  fire;  barrage  fire  of  the  artillery,  oblique 
or  enfilade  fire  of  the  flanking  defenses,  fire  at  will  on  the  part 
of  the  light  infantrymen,  uninterrupted  fire  on  the  part  of  the 
automatic  rifles,  barrage  fire  with  hand  grenades  or  rifles. 

If  the  infantry  has  not  time  to  arrive  at  the  trenches  before 
the  enemy,  it  lies  in  ambush  by  groups  in  the  shell  holes,  rap- 
idly establishes  barrages  in  the  trenches  around  its  shelters, 
and  operates  again  by  fire. 

It  is  not  at  all  necessary  that  the  range  of  the  infantry  fire 
be  extensive.  "The  employment  of  an  obstacle  (auxiliary  de- 
fenses)," say  the  instructions  of  the  8th  of  January,  "which 
holds  the  enemy  under  direct  and,  especially,  enfilading  fire, 
makes  it  possible  to  get  along  with  a  reduced  range.  The  in- 
fantry can  then  occupy  positions  near  the  enemy  which  at  first 
appeared  unfavorable." 

Experience  has  actually  proved  that  a  range  of  200  meters 
is  absolutely  sufficient  from  a  defensive  point  of  view. 

Morcnicnt. — Finally  the  defense  makes  use  of  one  more 
means — movement — that  is,  the  counter  attack. 

It  is  now  clearly  demonstrated  that  in  order  to  be  effective 
the  counter  attack  must  be  immediate.  It  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary, if  the  enemy  succeeds  in  putting  foot  in  our  trenches,  that 
he  be  met  with  a  counter  attack  before  he  can  get  firmly  estab- 
lished there,  a  fact  that  presupposes  that  the  force  charged 
with  this  mission  is  already  in  position  and  ready. 


14 

In  fact,  we  must  not  imagine  that  we  can  bring  up  from  the 
rear  of  any  particular  time  a  reserve  force  through  the  very 
dense  barrages  put  down  by  the  enemy ;  we  waste  precious 
time  and  suffer  very  serious  losses. 

It  is  therefore  necessary  to  have  the  troops  intended  to  make 
the  counter  arrack  he  placed  in  advance  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  zone  where  it  is  expected  that  they  will  have  to  operate. 
We  are  thus  induced  to  establish  -numerous  partial  reserve, 
forces,  apportioned  along  the  front,  at  the  disposal  of  the  bat- 
talion chiefs  and  of  the  colonels,  lessening  the  strength  of  the 
reserves  of  the  brigade  and  of  the  division  which  always  ar- 
rive too  late  and  in  their  moving  sustain  considerable  losses. 

The  trenches  for  these  troops  will  be  chosen  in  the  terrain 
lending  itself  best  to  the  play  of  the  counter  attacks,  according 
to  a  jrton  itrcrioiixly  extnhlixherf,  from  which  there  will  result 
the  organization  necessary  to  facilitate  their  action. 

If  it  is  desired  that  the  counter  attack  be  immediate,  it  is 
necessary  then  that  the  force  that  has  this  in  charge — 
First,  be  placed  in  advance  near  at  hand  ; 
Second,  be  established  according  to  a  preconceived  plan. 
In  case   these  local   counter  attacks  should  not  succeed   in 
stemming  the  attack  and  in  carrying  it  out  of  our  trenches,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  call  on  the  reserves  of  the  division,  of  the 
army  corps,  of  the  army,  situated  farther  back  in  the  rear,  to 
offer  offensive  returns  or  even  a  counter  offensive. 

These  operations  should  be  executed  without  delay,  and  at 
least  on  the  day  following  the  one  on  which  the  terrain  was  lost  ; 
they  are  conducted  in  the  manner  of  a  regular  attack — that  is 
to  say,  prepared  and  assisted  by  the  artillery. 

(C)   The  plan  of  defense. — These  principles,  sanctioned   by 
experience   and   by   several    instructions   from    General    Head 
quarters,  should  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  arrangements  to  be 
made  in  every  defensive  sector ;  that  is,  in  the  establishment  of 
the  plan  of  defense  of  each  division. 

The  plan,  as  we  stated  in  the  preceding  lecture,  is  established 
in  accordance  with  the  orders  in  the  note  from  General  Head- 
quarters based  on  the  experiences  at  Verdun. 
Its  object  is  to  fix — 
The  distribution  and  the  role  of  the  troops  occupying  the 

sector. 

The  necessary  organization  of  the  terrain. 
The  plan  to  adopt  in  case  of  attack. 


15 

The  extracts  from  this  plan  communicated  to  the  troops  are 
made  under  the  form  of  orders  in  case  of  alarm,  established  in 
advance,  and  they  should  be  perfectly  familiar  to  the  men  who 
are  to  carry  them  out. 

Thanks  to  this  document,  each  new  unit  is  immediately  and 
easily  informed  of  the  sector  that  it  occupies,  of  the  role  that 
it  is  to  play  therein,  and  of  the  means  that  it  is  to  employ. 

To  permit  the  division  to  establish  this  pfcin,  the  commander 
of  the  army  corps  should  fix — 

First.  The  mission  of  the  division,  the  extent  in  depth  of  the 
positions  that  it  is  to  maintain  at  any  price,  and,  if  necessary, 
the  important  points  of  the  positions  in  the  rear  that  it  must 
hold  to  facilitate  the  counter  offensive. 

Second.  The  strength  of  the  troops  of  the  reinforcement  (in- 
fantry and  artillery)  which  might  eventually  be  placed  at  the 
disposal  of  the  division  with  a  view  to  the  counter  offensive, 
with  an  indication  of  the  zones  where  they  will  be  stationed. 
_  The  preparation  of  the  counter  offensives  is  the  duty  of  the 
army  corps  by  virtue  of  the  importance  of  the  troops  put  into 
action  (one  or  several  divisions). 

Third.  The  zones  of  the  counter  attack  to  be  established,  as 
well  as  the  troops  to  be  devoted  to  it. 

The  plan  of  defense  established  by  the  division  can  be  divided 
into  four  parts : 

First  part :  General  outline  of  the  establishment  of  the  division 
sector. 

Second  part:  Plan  of  defense,  properly  speaking. 

Third  part:  Plan  of  action  of  the  artillery  (as  a  reminder). 

Fourth  part :  Additional  maps. 

In  order  to  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the  mechanism  of 
the  infantry  in  the  defense,  it  is  necessary  to  study  in  some 
detail  the  first  two  parts  of  this  plan, 

GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  DIVISION   SECTOR. 

There  will  be  special  lectures  on  the  method  of  conceiving 

and    realizing    a    defensive    establishment.     I    shall    therefore 

merely  sum  up  the  conclusions. 

Every  defensive  organization  has  as  its  object : 

(a)   Resisting,  at  least  in  its  important  parts,  the  strongest 

bombardments  in  such  a  way  as  to  permit  the  defender  to  repel 

the  attack  of  the  enemy. 


16 

(b)  Economizing'   the  forces  employed   in   the   first   line  for 
the  advantage  of  the  reserves. 

(c)  Facilitating  the  offensive  employment  of  the  reserves. 
A    defensive    organization    is    usually    composed    of    several 

positions,  each  of  them  being  far  enough  distant  from  the 
preceding  one  to  avoid  the  bombardment  by  the  artillery 
directed  upon  this  latter. 

Each  of  these  positions  should  be  echeloned  in  depth  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  give  full  play  to  the  reserves,  and  to  utilize  the 
terrain  and  the  resources  of  the  fortification  in  such  a  way  as 
to  force  the  enemy  to  fight  in  a  zone  which  is  favorable  to  us. 

We  need  not  discuss  the  necessity  for  continuous  lines  of 
trenches.  Isolated  supporting  points,  easily  located,  are  only 
easily  destroyed  shell  traps,  and  the  absence  of  continuous 
trenches  favors  infiltration.  The  supporting  point  is  not,  how- 
ever, suppressed  by  the  continuous  line,  but  it  should  be  integral 
with  the  network  of  the  trenches  and  communication  trenches 
instead  of  being  isolated. 

The  material  organization  of  a  sector  should  therefore  take 
account,  above  all — 

First,  of  the  importance  of  giving  to  the  organizations  neces- 
sary for  the  defense  shelters,  wire  entanglements,  shelters  for 
the  lookouts,  observation  stations,  flanking  defenses,  and  buried 
telephone  communications. 

Second,  of  making  necessary  arrangements  with  a  view  to 
counter  attacks  and  counter  offensive — shelters,  communication 
trenches  or  approaches,  passages  in  the  wire  entanglements, 
observation  stations  for  the  commanders,  groups  of  machine 
guns  flanking  each  other,  etc. 

Third,  of  the  necessity  for  flanking  defenses  by  machine  guns 
and  automatic  rifles,  echeloned  in  depth  and  placed  either  in 
isolated  posts  or  in  well-hidden  positions  outside  of  the  trench 
line.1 

Fourth,  of  defenses  on  the  reverse  slopes,  especially  for  the 
second  and  third  lines  of  each  position. 

1  There  can  he  found  in  the  instructions  of  the  General  Headquarters, 
Nov.  24,  1915,  upon  the  tactical  use  of  the  machine  grins,  and  of  those  of 
13th  of  February,  1916,  upon  the  employment  of  the  automatic  rifle,  all 
the  details  relative  to  the  use  of  these  arms,  which  would  be  too  long 
to  give  here. 


]>LAX   OF  DEFENSE. 

The  second  part  of  the  plan  consists  essentially  of  the  appor- 
tionment of  troops,  the  role  of  the  troops,  mid  their  conduct  in 
case  of  attack. 

It  is  based  upon  the  follow  general  principles,  mentioned  in 
the  note  on  the  experiences  of  Verdun : 

(a)  The  defense  is  made  in  depth,  upon  the  successive  posi- 
tions, which  admit  of  several  lines. 

(b)  No  force  charged  with  the  defense  of  a  portion  of  a  ter- 
rain ever  abandons  it,  no  matter  what  happens. 

(c)  All  terrain  lost  is  retaken  by  a  counter  attack  executed 
by  troops  reserved  for  this  purpose. 

(d)  Everything  should  be  planned  in  order  that  the  counter 
attack  may  be  immediate — that  is,  may  be  at  hand  and  launched 
immediately  after  the  success  of  the  enemy's  attack. 

As  far  as  the  role  of  the  defense  troops  is  concerned,  it  has 
long  been  the  idea  that  no  "  single  inch  of  ground  "  was  to  be 
"  lost "  at  any  price.  This  action  elsewhere  imposed  by  the 
commander  has  induced  those  carrying  it  out  to  accumulate  the 
greater  portion  of  their  forces  in  the  first  line  at  the  least  sign 
of  an  attack,  with  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  enemy  from 
getting  a  footing  there. 

That  was  an  error.  The  more  troops  placed  iu  the  first-line 
trenches  before  the  attack,  the  more  destructive  does  the  bom- 
bardment become,  and  the  lower  the  morale  of  the  troops,  so  that 
at  the  moment  of  the  assault  the  enemy  has  nothing  to  do  but 
take  prisoners;  moreover,  there  is  no  one,  or  almost  no  one,  to 
defend  the  second  and  third  lines. 

We  have  said,  in  effect,  and  we  reiterate,  that  an  infantry 
attack,  well  prepared  by  the  artillery,  almost  always  succeeds 
in  gaining  possession  of  the  first  lines. 

We  must  therefore  find*  a  means  of  losing  the  fewest  men 
possible  during  the  bombardment  and  of  driving  the  enemy 
from  our  first  line  as  soon  as  possible,  if  he  has  succeeded  in 
penetrating  to  that  point. 

The  conclusion  is  :  In  the  first  place,  we  must  leave  in  the  first 
line  only  the  minimum  effective  force — lookouts,  machine  gun- 
ners, automatic  riflemen— whose  duty  it  is  to  get  information  and 
to  furnish  a  first  resistance  in  case  of  a  surprise  attack.  This 


18 

menus  replacing,  as  far  as  possible,  the  man  by  the  machine. 
In  the  second  place,  we  must  echelon  the  reserve  forces  in  the 
rear. 

The  disposition  of  the  troops  should,  therefore,  be  made  in 
depth  and  be  based  upon  the  offensive  use  of  the  reserves. 

If  it  has  proved  impossible  to  break  the  attack,  it  must  be 
repelled  by  movement.  Thus  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
attack  is  respected — "  not  to  lose  a  single  inch  of  ground  "  —but 
by  counter  attack,  a  means  quite  different  from  merely  reinforc- 
ing the  first  line. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  the  different  conditions  of 
trench  warfare  lead  us  to  the  same  conclusions  as  those  based 
on  open  warfare.  It  is  a  fact  that  we  here  touch  principles 
which  are  always  true,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  form  assumed 
by  the  war.  Recall  what  we  said  concerning  the  relative  im- 
portance of  fire  and  action ;  the  one  is  a  powerful  and  indis- 
pensable element  of  preparation,  but  one  having  only  a  material 
action ;  the  other,  an  element  of  execution  having  a  moral  action, 
and  so  important  that  it  can  not  be  left  out  of  the  conflict.  This 
is  the  proof. 

But,  to  continue,  the  resemblance  between  open  warfare  and 
trench  warfare  will  be  still  more  striking. 

A  note  from  General  Headquarters,  following  our  offensive 
at  Champagne  in  September.  1915,  says,  in  effect :  "A  defensive 
situation  ought  to  be  treated  according  to  the  method  which 
has  been  accepted  in  our  army  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
and  which  consists  in  checking  the  attack  by  the  most  appro- 
priate means  but  with  a  minimum  of  force,  then  to  combat 
it  by  a  counteroffensive  executed  with  the  maximum  of  means. 
It  is  a  question — 

"  First,  of  rendering  the  front  safe  by  forces  reduced  to  the 
minimum ;  these  forces  constitute  in  reality  the  security  of  the 
armies  stationed  in  position. 

"  Second,  of  echeloning  in  the  rear  in  depth  the  reserves  of 
the  army  corps,  the  army,  the  group  of  the  armies,  distributed 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  able  to  be  directed  rapidly  upon 
the  points  that  are  threatened,  and  maintained  in  the  best  mili- 
tary and  instructive  condition,  to  be  ready  at  any  time  for 
offensive  action." 

As  to  the  troops  of  the  first  line,  whose  special  duty  is  the 
security  of  the  line,  they  are  to  detach  some  fractions  of  the 
service  of  the  advance  posts,  in  the  advanced  trenches,  or 


19 


"  trenches  of  the  (ulrdnri'  po-v/s,"  in  immediate  contact  with  the 
enemy,  to  insure  the  security  of  the  main  body  of  the  forces 
of  the  first  line  and  to  shield  them  from  a  sudden  attack.  This 
main  body  of  forces  will  itself  be  placet!  in  depth  ready  to 
furnish  counter  attacks  and  counter  offensives. 

"  To  obtain  a  judicious  application  of  these  orders,"  adds  the 
same  note,  "it  is  necessary  to  inspire  the  echelons  anew  witli 
the  idea  of  security  that  a  very  close  contact  with  the  enemy  for 
several  months  has  caused  them  to  lose  sight  of." 

And  thus  we  return  to  the  orders  of  the  Field  Service  concern- 
ing the  advance  posts,  here  troops  of  the  first  line. 

First.  The  elements  of  observation  represented  by  the  frac- 
tions that  occupy  the  first  line  of  trenches  —  small  garrisons, 
sections  furnishing  lookouts,  machine  gunners,  automatic  rifle- 
men —  are  charged  not  only  with  giving  information,  but  also 
with  offering  resistance  by  fire,  for  we  must  always  fear  sudden 
attack  (by  assault  or  gas). 

Second.  The  elements  of  resistance  or  reinforcements  repre- 
sented by  the  main  body  of  the  first-line  companies  and  a  cer- 
tain number  of  machine  guns  are  charged  with  offering  resist- 
ance by  fire,  either  in  the  first-line  trenches,  if  they  can  reach 
them,  or  in  the  second  line. 

Third.  The  reserves  of  the  battalion,  or  of  the  regiment,  must 
be  near  enough  to  the  front  to  be  able  to  make  immediate  coun- 
terattacks (one  company,  two  companies,  one  battalion  at  most  ). 

As  to  the  reserves  of  the  brigade  or  division,  they  are  more 
distant,  and  are  intended  for  counteroffensive  ;  that  is,  for  real 
attacks,  which  should  be  carefully  prepared  by  the  artillery. 

Thus  we  find  in  the  organization  of  a  position  : 

The  line  of  observation,  or  first  line; 

The  line  of  resistance,  or  line  of  support  ; 

The  line  of  redoubts,  or  points  of  assembly,  called  also  the  line 
of  counterattacks.  (Note  of  General  Headquarters  under  date 
of  Aug.  26,  1916.) 

The  following  are  the  principles  which  should  regulate  the 
division  and  role  of  the  troops: 

Disposition  in  depth  ; 

The  smallest  number  of  men  possible  in  the  first  line  for  obser- 
vation and  a  first  uesistance  ; 

As  great  a  number  of  men  as  possible  in  reserve,  either  to 
reinforce  the  resistance  or  especially  to  make  counter  attacks 
and  counter  offensives. 


20 

In  so  far  as  the  manner  of  holding  a  position  by  the  troops 
of  the  first  line  is  concerned,  we  must  distinguish  two  cast's: 

First  case :  Surprise  attack.  It  can  be  made  day  or  night 
when  the  wires  are  destroyed  at  certain  points,  without  pre- 
liminary bombardment  or  after  a  short  bombardment. 

If  the  lookouts'  service  is  well  performed  and  if  the  flanking 
defenses  are  in  good  working  order,  the  attack  should  be  re- 
pulsed by  fire,  without  any  need  of  cooperation  on  the  part  of 
the  artillery. 

The  flanking  machine  gunners  and  automatic  riflemen  being 
intact,  should  actually  do  their  work  normally,  and  be  rein- 
forced by  the  fire  of  the  main  part  of  the  companies  of  the  first 
line  charged  with  resistance. 

Second  case :  An  attack  preceded  by  a  preparation  by  artil- 
lery. If  we  could  prevent  the  attack  from  penetrating  into  our 
trenches,  this  would  be  the  best  solution,  as  it  Is  always  easier 
and  less  costly  to  guard  than  to  retake  a  line.  With  this  in 
view,  the  artillery  should  respond  to  the  preparatory  fire  by  a 
fire  of  counter  preparation  (with  heavy  howitzers,  if  possible) 
upon  the  first  line  of  the  enemy's  trenches  which  we  know  to  be 
full  at  the  moment  of  an  attack. 

It  will  certainly  inflict  perceptible  losses  upon  the  enemy,  but 
still  will  not  prevent  them,  when  the  time  arrives,  from  rushing 
forward  to  the  assault.  It  will  then  try  to  stop  them  by  bar- 
rages, while  the  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles  will  enter 
into  action,  soon  supported  by  the  fire  of  the  companies  of  the 
first  line  who  have  come  out  of  their  dugouts  (rifle  tire,  liar- 
rage  with  hand  grenades  and  rifles),  while  the  troops  of  the 
counter  attack  make  ready  to  advance. 

But  this  presupposes  that  the  artillery  and  infantry  have  been 
warned  of  the  exact  moment  when  the  enemy  is  coming  out  of 
his  trenches.  Experience,  however,  proves  that  this  is  the 
most  difficult  point  of  the  question,  and  this  for  two  reasons : 
The  lookouts,  who  are  men  chosen  from  among  the  most  coura- 
geous and  the  most  dependable,  sustain  losses  and  may  lie  weak- 
ened by  such  a  bombardment ;  then,  the  most  conscientious  ob- 
servation may  be  baffled  by  the  cloud  of  dust  and  the  smoke 
caused  by  the  bursting  of  the  shells. 

No  matter  what  may  be  the  difficulties  to  b,e  overcome,  every- 
thing depends  upon  the  service  of  the  lookouts,  which,  there- 
fore, assumes  the  utmost  importance.  Therefore  it  is  necessary 
to  watch  very  carefully,  no  matter  how  violent  the  bombard- 


21 

ment  may  be,   in  order  to  be  certain  that  at  any  particular 
moment  there  may  be  warning  of  an  assault  or  of  a  gas  cloud. 

The  pamphlet  for  the  instruction  of  the  rifleman  says  on 
this  subject : 

"  The  lookouts  remain  constantly  at  their  posts,  even  during 
the.  most  violent  bombardment.  They  are  relieved  very  fre- 
quently (about  every  10  minutes  during  the  bombardment). 
The  noncommissioned  officers  assure  themselves  frequently 
that  the  lookouts  are  vigilant." 

One  must  use  his  wits  in  each  particular  case  to  find  the. 
best  means  of  procedure  for  giving  the  alarm : 

Armored  shelters  for  the  lookouts  at  points  having  the  best 

views ; 

Flank  lookouts  under  cover  of  the  slope ; 

Lookouts  in  an  observation  station  placed  in  the  rear ; 

Finally,  signals  agreed  upon  from  aircraft. 

More  will  be  said  on  this  subject  when  we  study  the  mea'ns  of 
liaison. 

No  matter  what  is  done,  it  may  happen  that  the  main  part 
of  the  companies  of  the  first  line,  by  coming  out  of  the  shelters 
too  late,  do  not  succeed  in  occupying  their  combat  positions, 
which  have  already  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  These 
companies  should  then  rapidly  organized  for  themselves  a  center 
of  reaixlinicc  around  their  shelters,  in  the  craters,  and  with  the 
aid  of  the  barrages  improvised  in  the  connecting  trenches  while 
waiting  to  be  rescued  by  the  counter  attack. 

Even  if  the  first  wave  has  passed  them,  the  situation  is  far 
from  being  hopeless.  They  should  not  busy  themselves  with 
these  first  waves,  which  will  be  accounted  for  by  the  troops  of 
the  counter  attack ;  they  must  concentrate  all  their  efforts  upon 
the  wave  of  moppers-up  and  the  enemy's  supports,  which  they 
must  try  to  stop  at  any  cost.  If  they  succeed  in  this,  the  first 
wave  already  passed  will  be  completely  cut  off  and  will  soon 
be  obliged  to  surrender. 

It  is  often  of  an  advantage  for  the  commander  of  the  com- 
pany of  the  first  line  to  reserve  for  his  own  use  a  picked  group 
of  grenadiers,  that  he  can  send  at  any  given  moment,  either 
to  the  point  that  is  most  seriously  threatened  or  to  that  point 
upon  which  he  wishes  to  strengthen  his  resistence.  In  fact,  the 
best  means  to  utilize  in  this  case  is  the  grenade,  the  correct 
weapon  for  the  Infantry  to  use  in  close  combat.  Barrages  may 
be  executed  at  25  meters  by  placing  a  man  every  10  meters  with 


I  he  offensive,  or  one  man  every  15  meters  with  the  defensive 
grenade. 

It  is  of  priinnrif  inijtortuni-c  to  he  alilr  to  linri'  fjic  <lu(/oiitx. 

In  order  that  the  debouch  from  the  dugouts  may  be  executed 
rapidly,  every  man  must  keep  sight  of  his  equipment  and  con- 
stantly  have  his  arms  within  reach.  The  different  exits  are 
apportioned  in  advance  among  the  groups,  who  must  know  per- 
fectly their  particular  duties  immediately  after  the  sortie, 
whether  the  enemy  has  not  yet  attained  the  position  or  has 
already  penetrated,  as  well  as  the  route  to  the  combat  positions. 

Moreover,  as  it  is  impossible  to  have  the  total  number  con- 
stantly on  the  qui  vive  during  a  preparation  which  may  last  a 
long  time,  a  group  of  a  few  men  opposite  each  exit  should  be 
rcudij  to  turn  out  at  <i  nioinnii'x  notice.  It  is  from  this  piquet 
that  a  man  is  selected  to  go  out  from  time  to  time  to  observe 
whether  the  enemy  is  extending  his  fire.1 

To*  sum  tip.  if  the  assailant  is  met  by  the  defender  upon  the 
parapet  the  attack  is  almost  certain  to  fail ;  on  the  contrary,  if 
the  assailant  anticipates  the  defenders  at  the  entrance  of  their 
dugouts  the  attack  has  the  greatest  possible  chance  of  success. 
P>ut  it  is  a  question  of  seconds,  and  not  of  minutes.  Accordingly 
nothing  should  be  left  to  improvisation;  there  should  exist  a 
precise  organization,  and  very  clear  orders,  familiar  to  every- 
body, applied  frequently,  carried  out  to  the  least  details. 

Finally,  the  troops  reserved  for  the  counterattacks  take  the 
same  precautions  as  the  reinforcements  during  the  bombard- 
ment and  at  the  moment  of  the  attack.  Their  order  indicates 
the  particular  role  to  be  played,  the  advance  toward  the  posi- 
tions to  be  occupied  and  routes  to  follow  (carefully  marked  out 
and  reconnoitered  in  advance),  the  direction  of  the  counter- 
attack, the  line  not  to  be  passed,  the  combination  of  these  move- 
ments with  the  fire  of  certain  flanking  defenses,  etc.  These  troops 
are  at  the  disposal  of  the  battalion  commanders  and  colonels, 
who  are  really  the  soul  of  the  defense. 

From  all  the  preceding  it  results  that,  if  the  organization  of 
the  terrain  has  been  well  understood,  the  effectiveness  of  the 
defense  depends : 

First.  Upon  the  immediate  knowledge  of  the  moment  when 
the  enemy  issues  from  his  trenches  or  attempts  a  gas  attack. 

1  There  will  be  found  in  the  Manual  for  Chiefs  of  Platoon  (p.  '\~\  i  a 
scheme  (if  construction  of  duj-'out  exits,  which  can  be  used  to  ad- 
vantage. 


23 

Second.   Jpon  the  rapidity  of  the  debouch  from  the  dugouts. 

Third.  I'pon  the  energy  and  instant  a neousness  of  the  action. 

"Numerous  resistances,"  says  the  Manual  for  Platoon  Com- 
manders, "that  have  been  successful  in  spite  of  the  accumu- 
lation of  formidable  means,  have  proved  that  valorous  defenders, 
even  in  small  numbers,  are  still  able,  at  the  moment  of  the 
assault,  to  occupy  their  ruined  trenches  and  stop  the  enemy 
there.  What  the  artillery  can  accomplish  is  the  diminution  of 
the  material  means  and  of  the  morale  of  the  defenders,  not  their 
complete  destruction.  A  soldier's  spiritual  power  of  resistance 
remains  superior  to  any  material  effect  whatever.  Every  sol- 
dier, therefore,  should  submit  to  the  bombardment  with  stoicism, 
and  say  to  himself  that  if  he  escapes  he  is  certain,  with  the  aid 
of  some  uninjured  comrades  and  machine  guns,  to  mow  down 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy,  provided  that  he  can  reach  his  trench  or 
the  shell  holes  that  have  replaced  it  in  time. 

"A  man  should  never  give  himself  up  to  the  first  disagreeable 
impression  that  lie  experiences  when  an  enemy  has  broken 
through  the  lilies  to  the  right  and  left  of  his  position,  for  the 
enemy  also  has  upon  his  flanks  and  in  his  rear  organizations 
which  are  still  holding  their  positions.  The  enemy's  local  suc- 
cess has,  in  reality,  inclosed  him  in  a  fire  pocket  which  should 
close  in  on  him,  and  from  which  he  can  not  escape  if  our  men 
keep  up  their  courage. 

"  The  defender  must  primarily  be  resolute  in  fighting  to  the 
end,  and  must  not  give  up  the  struggle  because  it  seems  to  him 
that  his  neighbors  have  the  worst  of  it ;  beyond  these  neighbors 
there  are  others  who  are  holding  their  ground  and  who  will  come 
to  his  aid.  A  man  must  never  judge  a  fight  by  what  he  sees 
in  his  immediate  vicinity,  but  have  confidence  in  his  battalion 
and  in  his  regiment. 

"  No  single  inch  of  terrain  should  be  voluntarily  abandoned, 
no  matter  what  the  circumstances  may  be.  A  force,  even  when 
surrounded,  should  resist  to  the  very  last  man  without  falling 
back,  the  sacrifice  of  the  individual  being  the  very  condition  of 
the  victory." 

Such  are  the  essential  principles  and  the  general  ideas  which 
should  be  primary  in  the  establishment  of  a  plan  of  defense 
and  which  one  should  always  have  present  in  mind  when  lie 
makes  a  visit  to  a  sector.  The  force  is  really  ready  to  receive 
the  enemy's  attack  only  if  it  has  anticipated  all  the  acts  of  the 


defense  to  the  least  detail,  and  only  if  it  is  morally  prepared 
for  the  role  which  it  is  to  play. 

Below  is  the  general  plan  for  the  defense  of  a  division  sector. 

As  everything  depends  on  that  which  concerns  the  infantry 
(the  defensive  organization,  role  and  employment  of  the  units), 
so  the  plan  of  action  of  the  artillery  and  the  role  to  be  played 
in  the  defense  by  the  aviation  corps  should  be  in  perfect  har- 
mony with  the  arrangements  made  by  the  infantry.  This  will 
be  covered  in  the  next  lecture. 


PLAN  OF  DEFENSE  OF  A  DIVISION  SECTOR. 

FIRST  PART. 

GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  A  DIVISION    SECTOB. 

I.  Mission  of  the  division. 
II.  General  organization  of  the  defense  of  the  sector. 

(a)  Limits  of  the  division  sector. 

( b )  Brief  description  of  the  division  sector. 

(c)  Principal  characteristics  of  the  terrain. 

(d)  Brief  description  of  the  first  position. 

(f?)   Brief  description  of  the  intermediary  position. 
(/)   Brief  description  of  the  second  position. 

III.  Division  into  subsectors  of  brigades,  regiments,  bat- 
talions. 

IV.  Elements  of  the  sector  not  belonging  to  the  division 
(territorial  units,  trench  batteries,  machine  guns  of 
position,  etc.). 

SECOND   PART. 

PLAN  OT  DEFENSE. 

V.  General  principles  serving  as  a  base  for  the  establish- 
ment of  the  plan.1 

1  This  paragraph  will  be  drawn  up  as  follows :  (a)  The  defense  will  be 
organized  in  depth  upon  the  successive  positions,  which  include  several 
lines,  (b)  No  force  assigned  to  the  defense  of  a  portion  of  terrain  ever 
abandons  it,  no  matter  what  happens,  (c)  All  ground  lost  is  regained  by 
a  counter  attack  executed  by  the  troops  reserved  for  this  purpose. 
(d)  Everything  should  be  organized  so  that  the  counter  attack  may 
be  immediate;  that  is,  be  launched  immediately  after  the  success  of  the 
enemy's  attack. 


25 

VI.  Determination  of  the  probable  zones  of  attack. 
VII.  Choice  of  the  principal  centers  of  resistance. 
VIII.  Preparation  of  the  local  counter  attacks  (total  strength, 
location,    direction    of    movement,    authority    which 
orders  the  counter  attack,  etc.). 

IX.  Study  of  the  execution  of  the  counter  offensive,  first 
by  a  regiment,  then  by  a  brigade  (approaches,  plac- 
ing, direction  of  movement,  authority  which  orders  the 
counter  offensive,  etc.). 

Positions  in  readiness  of  the  troops  of  the  division. 
Command  post.     Command  observation  stations.     Tele- 
phonic communications,  visual  signaling,  runners,  etc. 
XII.  Orders  in  case  of  a  gas  attack. 

XIII.  Plan  of  food  supplies. 

XIV.  Plan  of  evacuation. 

THIRD   PART. 

PLAN    OF    ACTION    OF    THE    ARTILLERY    (AS    A    REMINDER). 

FOURTH    PART. 
ADDITIONAL    MAPS. 

XV.  Battle  map :  scale,  1/20,000,  bearing  the  data  contained 

in  paragraphs  II,  III,  IV. 

XVI.  Battle  map:  scale,  1/20,000,  giving  the  apportioning  of 
the  troops  (infantry,  artillery,  engineers)  in  the  nor- 
mal stations. 

XVII.  Battle  map  :  scale,  1/20,000,  giving  the  positions  in  readi- 
ness.    (Par.  X.) 
XVIII.  Battle  map  :  scale,  1/20.000,  for  the  study  of  the  counter 

offensives.     (Par.  IX.) 

XIX.  Battlo  map :  scale,  1/20,000,  of  the  command  posts,  ob- 
servation stations  of  the  command,  communications, 
etc.  (Par.  XI.) 


APPENDIX  TO  THE  FIFTH  LECTURE. 

Documents  contained  in  the  sector  iile. 


FIRST   PART. 

OCCUPATION     AND    DEFENSE    OF    THE    SECTOR. 

I.  Map,  scale  of  1/50,000,  fixing  the  limits  of  the  sector  (lateral 
and  rear  limits),  with  indication  of  the  limits  of  ihe  sub- 
sertors,  neighboring  units,  locations  of  the  headquarters 
and  staff. 

I  I.  Map,  scale  of  1/10,000,  giving  the  apportioning  of  the  troops 
of  the  lirst  line,  command  post,  location  of  machine  guns 
and  of  trench  mortars  assigned  to  the  sector.  Communica- 
tions with  the  neighboring  units. 

III.  .Map,   scale  of   1/20,000,   of  the  defensive  scheme  of  each 

successive  position. 

PLAN    OF    DEFENSE. 

IV.  Map,  scale  of  1/20,000,  of  liaisons  of  every  sort  (telephonic, 

visual,  etc.)  and  of  the  observing  stations. 
V.  Location  of  the  elements  billeted  or  bivouacked  in  the  rear 

of  the  troops  of  the  first  line. 

VT.  Elements  of  the  army  participating  in  the  defense  of  the 
sector  (machine  guns  of  position,  units  of  artillery  and 
of  the  engineering  section,  etc.). 

SECOND  PART. 

PLAN    OF    THE    ARTILLERY    ACTION. 
THIRD   PART. 

DOCUMENTS    CONCERNING    THE    ENEMY. 

T.  Map.  scale  of  1/10,000,  of  the  enemy's  batteries. 
II.  Resume  of  the  information  collected  concerning  the  enemy 
(order  of  battle,  apportioning  of  troops,  itineraries  of  the 
reliefs,    machine    guns,    trench    mortars,    observing    sta- 
tions, command  post,  depots,  supplies,  etc.) 
(26) 


27 


III.  Group  of  photographs  of  the  sector. 
1 V.  Special  listening  posts. 


FOURTH  PART. 

PLANS    OF    WORKS. 

Delivery   of   material    (depots   for   materials,    tools,   sawing. 
workshops  for  fascine  work,  etc.). 

FIFTH  PART. 

VARIOUS    DOCUMENTS. 

I.  List  of  all  the  cantonments  and  camps  with  an  indication 

of  their  capacities. 

II.  List  of  the  elements  of  the  army  stationed  in  Ihe  sector. 
III.  Mine  works. 

IV.  Special  orders  in  case  of  a  gas  attack  by  the  enemy. 
V.  Preparations  for  the  emission  of  gas  on  our  front. 
VI.  Arrangements  for  supplying  the  troops    (centers  of  sup- 
plies, points  of  distribution,  kitchens,  depots  for  food, 
depots  for  munitions,  sector  depots). 
VII.  Special  measures  for  the  provision  of  water  (points  where 

water  is  to  be  found,  watering  places,  wells,  etc.). 
VIII.  Orders  regulating  evacuations. 
IX.  Employment  of  carrier  pigeons. 

X.  Orders  regulating  the  traffic.  Orders,  map,  scale  of 
1/80,000,  indicating  the  routes,  roads  of  communica- 
tion, the  points  not  to  be  passed  night  and  day  by  auto- 
mobiles or  wagons. 

XI.  Map,    scale   of    1/50.000,    showing    the    railroads    (stand- 
ard gauge, 60-centimeter  roads, and  40-centimeter  roads). 
The  other  records   (of  the  subset-tors,  of  the  centers  of  re- 
sistcnce,  of  the  points  of  support)  are  less  complete,  but  should 
contain  the  inventory  of  material  of  every  sort  relating  to  the 
subsector,  center  of  resistance,  or  point  of  support. 

o 


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